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Historical Review of Social Security and its Effect on Personal Savings.
Social Security has left its indelible mark on the American culture, however there still 
remains considerable debate over the effect it has had in curtailing personal savings for the 
express purpose of providing for one’s retirement. This study begins with a review of the origins 
of the modem Social Security system and critiques previous attempts at trying to quantify its 
impact on personal savings habits. While most previous attempts have aimed to construct a 
future benefits variable in order to measure this effect, it is presumed in this model that current 
observations and experiences with Social Security are the most significant factors in determining 
an individual’s level of preparation for retirement. Of particular concern is the effect 
information about several important Social Security factors has had in determining the aggregate 
level of personal savings for the nation. Under certain conditions, several of these factors seem 
to have a significant effect on the level of personal savings and each has its own measurable 
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CHAPTER I :  INTRODUCTION j
In the spring of 1995, debate raged in the halls of Congress over a proposed amendment 
to the Constitution that would have required the federal government to operate within a balanced 
budget. What ultimately sent this measure to an early grave was not a lack of support from the 
American populace nor an insistence on the part of our elected representatives to continue the 
rampant deficits of the past. The fatal flaw was a proposed measure to cut spending through 
modifications to the existing Social Security system. The mere mention of increasing the eligible 
retirement age or decreasing benefits created such a firestorm of protest that even the most 
powerful government officials were left cowering in its wake.
Sixty years after its initial implementation, Social Security has not only established itself 
as the largest single government program, but also has emerged as an American icon just as 
recognizable as the stars and stripes. Conceived in the financial ruin of the Great Depression, 
America’s venture into social insurance has survived despite decades of fierce criticism and 
attack. It’s success has been due in large part to its ownership by each of the citizens of the 
country. Unlike most government programs which exist upon a portion of the general taxation 
revenues, the Social Security system has a direct link to working citizens forged by their 
earmarked contributions. Those only slightly familiar with the system understand that a portion 
of every paycheck is “invested”, so that they may reap the benefits once retirement age is 
attained. The promise of this eventual retirement stipend is so coveted that the program is often 
times known as the “third rail” of American politics, fatal to all those that unwittingly try their 
hand at reforming the system (Hage 1995).
The establishment of a federal social insurance program has had a direct impact on the 
American culture. Before the establishment of Social Security, the concept of a preordained
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retirement age was a foreign concept to most workers. One merely tried to stay employed until 
such time as their families agreed to take care of their basic necessities or they ran out of 
employment options. Today, the age of sixty-five is almost universally accepted as the entry 
point into retirement because it is at this time that a majority of Americans start to receive 
benefits from the Social Security Administration. The evolution of this system has coincided 
with other factors that have left their indelible mark upon the fabric of our culture during the last 
half century. Tremendous population growth, medical advances that prolong life expectancies, 
periods of enormous economic growth coupled with the dramatic slowdown experienced over the 
last few decades. What has evolved is a system that has had to be modified greatly to meet the 
promises made to the original recipients, all the while creating an uncertain future for 
tomorrow’s beneficiaries.
The impact of Social Security on the individual in our society has been much more 
difficult to determine. By establishing a “guaranteed” retirement stipend, one could surmise that 
individuals would no longer have the impetus to provide for their own golden years and instead 
rely on the promise of future benefits. Many models that have aimed to prove just such an 
assertion have produced some very ambiguous results. Much of the difficulty lies in quantifying 
the actual amount of savings that is specifically related to retirement. Similarly, efforts that aim 
to illustrate the benefits attributable to Social Security have also yielded questionable results. 
Much of this difficulty lays in the methodology chosen, relying on assumptions that may have 
been true in the Depression years but are no longer valid six decades hence.
In order to properly gauge the impact that Social Security has had upon our culture, it is 
important to first investigate the economic and political climate in which it was first formulated 
and later evolved. Chapter II presents this historical review of the modem Social Security 
system. Chapter III continues with several derivations of the personal savings function and a 
review of the past attempts to quantify the effect Social Security has had upon personal savings.
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Chapters IV presents the development of a new model which will quantify the effects of this 
guaranteed government stipend on aggregate personal savings while taking into account 
alternative methods of investment. Chapter V reviews the empirical results gained from this 
endeavor and the potential economic consequences of the findings. In Chapter VI we will 
conclude with a look at the challenges that will confront the Social Security system in the years 
ahead and will examine some potential avenues for reform that are currently at the disposal of 
our elected representatives.
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CHAPTER II: EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Early Influences on American Social Insurance
The Social Security system owes its successful enactment to the ravages brought on by 
the Great Depression of the 1930’s. However, the origins of a nationalized social insurance 
program are to be found even before the turn of this century. In fact, old-age insurance programs 
had already been established in Europe a full half century before the United States became the 
last industrial country in the world to enact a program that aided the elderly (Ferrara 1985). In 
1893, the United States first explored the concept of social insurance when the Commissioner of 
Labor was directed to review a system established by the Chancellor of Germany some ten years 
earlier (Nash 1988). Although nothing significant came of this early venture, the onslaught of 
worker’s revolution movements across the globe brought to light the needs of employees not just 
in their working years, but also after they had exhausted their productive capacities. In 1911, the 
Commissioner of Labor was again directed to publish a comprehensive survey that detailed the 
social insurance programs gaining popularity in Europe (Nash 1988). Even though it would take 
quite a number of years before any serious attempt was made to implement such a plan on the 
federal level, several states enacted similar programs based on the successes that had been 
occurring across the Atlantic.
From the onset, such compulsory insurance plans were met with scom and ridicule and 
were even considered by some to be wholly un-American. In 1910, the Massachusetts 
Commission on Old Age Pensions described mandatory social insurance as “unthinkable and 
distasteful” (Ferrara 1985). Later that decade Samuel Gompers, the powerful head of the 
American Federation of Labor, described a proposal for such a system as being “in its essence 
undemocratic” and pledged to assist in the “inauguration of a revolution against compulsory
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insurance” (Ferrera 1985). What makes this statement especially intriguing is the fact that most 
compulsory insurance programs, including Social Security, were marketed as being to the benefit 
of the average worker, which one would assume would also be of interest to a powerful labor 
party. In 1924, the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce described the growing popularity of 
compulsory insurance plans as “un-American and socialistic and unmistakably earmarked as an 
entering wedge of communist propaganda”. The emergence of a social insurance plan that would 
be acceptable to the American populace would have to be in response to a great catastrophe, 
given the deep seated mistrust of such a system.
In October of 1929, such an enormous calamity did strike the nation and the need for 
government assistance became exceedingly apparent. Even with the world in such a disastrous 
economic state, it would take six long years before legislation finally brought forth the reality of 
compulsory insurance. The first national referendum for such a change was the brain child of 
Louisiana Senator Huey Long (Nash 1988). In 1934, he founded the Share-the-Wealth 
movement and quickly enrolled five million members who were discontent with the statis quo. 
Senator Long’s assassination a short time later slowed the expansion of this initiative, but it gave 
valuable evidence to President Roosevelt that a ground swell of support existed for programs that 
guaranteed a basic standard of living. Many of his earlier supporters later joined the Old Age 
Revolving Pension Fund movement, led by Francis Townsend, which advocated a $260 a month 
federal pension for all individuals over the age of sixty. Grassroots efforts such as these ensured 
that the issue of compulsory social insurance would be a hotly debated issue during the upcoming 
presidential election of 1936.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt had long been an advocate of the social reforms that 
were then thriving in Europe. However, political savvy told him that without the requisite 
populist support, such a radical program would be doomed to failure as opponents invoked the 
“red scare” threat in brandishing his plans. To make a social insurance system acceptable in this
5
country, it had to be devoid of any overtones of state paternalism or socialist ideologies of
redistribution (Nash 1988). After witnessing the success of Senator Long and the documented
victories of several state-run insurance programs, Roosevelt now had the confidence that the
nation was ready for such monumental reform. He was also determined to ease the grip the
depression held over the country and knew citizens were willing to try virtually anything, just as
long as it produced some meaningful results. However, the depression also brought about the
seemingly insurmountable problem of how to pay for such a far reaching new bureaucracy,
especially in light of the fact that one in every five able bodied persons were no longer employed
and therefore did not pay income taxes.
Roosevelt brought together the brightest members of his personal staff as well as select
academic experts in the fields of business and economics to construct a program that guaranteed
citizens a basic security against the uncertainties of life. The panel was sent forth in its mission
with the following words from the president:
I am looking for a sound means which I can recommend to provide at once 
security against several of the great disturbing factors in life - especially those 
which relate to unemployment and old age. I believe that there should be a 
maximum of cooperation between states and the federal government...
These three great objectives - the security of the home, the security of 
livelihood, and the security of social insurance - are, it seems to me, a minimum 
of the promise that we can offer to the American people. They constitute 
a right which belongs to every individual and every family willing to work.
They are the essential fulfillment of measures taken toward relief, recovery 
and reconstruction (Nash 1988).
The commission realized that the greatest threat facing a wage earner was the loss of 
employment and the associated income earned. To mitigate the risk of such uncertainty, it was
recommended that the federal government take steps to safeguard the citizens against the 
hardships of unemployment by stimulating private investment and providing public jobs during 
such times when industry cannot remain fully employed (Report 1935). The additional demands
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on the elderly of meeting their financial obligations was also addressed at length by the 
commission in its findings:
The need of the people of this country for some safeguard against misfortunes 
which cannot be wholly eliminated in the man-made world of ours is tragically 
apparent at this time, when 18,000,000 people, including children and the aged, 
are dependent upon emergency relief for their subsistence and approximately 
10,000,000 workers have no employment other than relief work. Many millions 
more have lost their entire savings, and there has occurred a very great decrease 
in earnings (Report 1935).
The commission ultimately recommended a monumental bill that would cover each of 
the societal shortfalls detailed in their report. The original Social Security Act was delivered to 
Congress as a single piece of legislation containing ten distinct sections. The first six titles 
provided the basis for old-age assistance and insurance, unemployment compensation, aid to 
children under economic duress, and the establishment and maintenance of adequate public 
health services. The remaining sections outlined the taxation provisions to fund such reforms 
and delegated responsibility to the newly formed Social Security Administration (SSA). In 
addition, a small provision in the original bill called for need based assistance to the blind, the 
only categorical disability specifically addressed by the commission. After much internal debate, 
it was determined that compulsory health insurance would ultimately doom an already radical 
piece of legislation. The future inclusion of health care was to be accomplished by the SSA soon 
after the enactment of the original bill was accomplished (Nash 1988). To date, neither the SSA 
nor any other government agency has been successful in passing an amendment to the original 
bill that would mandate compulsory health care coverage for all Americans.
Roosevelt was adamant in protecting the guarantees provided through Social Security 
from future generations of politicians bent on raiding its coffers for their own personal benefit. 
To accomplish this objective, he found it necessary to establish an alternate method to finance 
such an enormous undertaking. If the newly devised social insurance system were to be paid out
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of the general revenue fund, it would most assuredly be in the perilous position of being
diminished or canceled during each budgetary review. Instead, Roosevelt and his allies looked to 
the original definition of the program to determine the optimal funding approach; that is a 
protection for working individuals against the uncertainties and hardships to be encountered 
during their life.
Contributions by the employees represent a self-respecting method through 
which workers make their own provision for old age. In addition many workers 
themselves on the verge of dependency will benefit through being relieved of the 
necessity of supporting dependent parents on reduced incomes, and at the expense 
of the health and well-being of their own families. To the employers, contributions 
toward old-age annuities are very similar to the revenues which they regularly set 
aside for depreciation on capital equipment (Report 1935).
In the construction of this funding mechanism, the administration not only provided a 
more than adequate method by which to finance their social insurance plan. They had also 
developed a valuable counter argument to the popular criticism that such a plan was merely an 
entry into a more paternalistic society. J. Douglas Brown, an original member of the 
commission, stated that it was their goal to “provide a mechanism whereby the individual could 
prevent widespread dependency through his own efforts” (Nash 1988). Although such 
opportunities were already available in the private market, it was evident that such a voluntary 
approach had failed to prevent widespread dependency in old age for most of the American 
population (Nash 1988). The responsibility for providing a basic level of support would be 
directly attributable to the efforts of the working population, not as a blatant government hand 
out. Originally, the combined contributory rate from a worker’s payroll was recommended to be 
one percent divided equally between employers and employees. It was to be increased by one 
percent at five year increments until the maximum rate of five percent was reached a full twenty 
years after the implementation of the program (Report 1935).
A system that is financed through the lifetime contributions of the employed members of 
a society has a major difficulty from its inception. Namely, how does the government provide 
benefits for the individuals that will retire shortly after its implementation, since they have not 
had adequate time to build a reserve to meet the basic obligations of retirement. The concept 
derived to answer this dilemma is credited both with creating widespread initial support for the 
program as well as possibly causing its eventual bankruptcy if it is allowed to continue in its 
current state. Working individuals would not actually build a reserve for their own benefit, but 
would instead provide the necessary resources for the segment of the population that had already 
reached the age of retirement. This “pay-as-you-go” concept was originally envisioned to build a 
sizable reserve for use by subsequent generations of retirees. Any surplus funds that were gained 
from payroll taxes would be “invested” in the Social Security Trust Fund, an interest bearing 
account financed through the purchase of treasury notes. The enactment of the Social Security 
system would not only refrain from using general revenues at the expense of other government 
programs, it’s surpluses could be used to meet the immediate needs of these other government 
programs through the purchase of these bonds.
Each of the components of the initial American venture into social insurance was 
designed to mitigate the impact that misfortune would have on the earning potential of the 
individual. Unemployment insurance was instituted as a bridge to span the period that a worker 
was temporarily not earning a wage. Special provisions were included to provide for the welfare 
of children during such times that their guardians could not support their most fundamental 
needs. Likewise, the old age insurance portion of Social Security was conceived as insulation 
against the inevitable hardships that would befall an individual who no longer could provide 
productive services and had no other type of savings. All of the major industrial countries 
enacted such measures to provide a subsistence floor of protection against the major risks 
threatening a discontinuation of wages. It was only after World War II, that this original concept
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gave way to the notion that social protection was a basic human right of all citizens (Nash 1988).
In their report to the president, the commission concluded that the costs of destitution and
dependency that result from an elderly population not properly cared for were a huge burden to
society. In considering the substantial costs of the proposed Social Security measure, the impact
of reducing this level of destitution should be coupled with the avoidance of a dependency class
of retirees in gauging its true value to our society (Report 1935).
As debate ensued during the 74th Congress, well illustrated was the plight of fifty
percent of the over sixty-five population who were then considered dependent on their family’s
goodwill or the charitable contributions of society (Nash 1988). The deliberations were tautly
drawn along party lines, which favored the president given the Democratic majority in both
chambers. However, most politicians were fully aware of the hardships endured by their
constituents; ravaged by an unrelenting economic calamity without prospect for gainful
employment and quickly running out of options. Many conservatives were not convinced,
however, that such a monumental reform did not simply alleviate the misery of the current
generation by mortgaging the future prosperity of subsequent generations. To answer these
allegations, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee stated that the proposed system of
old-age insurance “comports better than any substitute we have discovered with the American
concept that free men want to earn their security and not ask for doles - that what is due as a
matter of earned right is far better than a gratuity...Social Security is not a handout, it is not
charity, it is not relief’ (Nash 1988). The president also garnered support by illustrating his
program’s likeness to another dearly held American institution:
So, also security was attained in the earlier days through the interdependence of 
members of families upon each other and of the families within a small 
community upon each other. The complexities of great communities and 
of organized industry make less real these simple means of security. Therefore,
we are compelled to employ the active interest of the Nation as a whole through 
government in order to encourage a greater security for each individual who 
composes it (Cohen 1985).
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The president thought that the struggle to guarantee such vital protections for the
citizenry was above the petty political debates that could potentially undermine his best
intentions. Therefore, he invoked his powerful vision for meeting the challenges laid out by the
forefathers of our country:
Fear and worry based on unknown danger contribute to social unrest 
and economic demoralization. If, as our Constitution tells us, our Federal 
Government was established among other things, ‘to promote the general 
welfare’, it is our plain duty to provide for that security upon which welfare 
depends (Cohen 1985).
The immediacy of a catastrophic societal problem and the full attention of the President 
of the United States enabled such a monumental piece of legislation to be debated and enacted in 
only six months. Several attempts were made to belabor the basic bill with provisions that would 
either cause its bankruptcy or greatly hinder its full implementation. Interestingly enough, one 
such provision, proposed by a Senator Clark, is still being considered today as a viable 
alternative to the existing system. Under his amendment, employers were to be given the option 
of disregarding the compulsory public system if they provided comparable retirement protection. 
An opponent observed that this was the equivalent of the government “inviting and encouraging 
competition with its own plan which would ultimately would undermine and destroy it” (Ferrara 
1985). It was the issue of allowing competitive interests in the provisioning of Social Security 
that had to be ultimately debated in conference and delayed the final passage of the entire act.
Evolution o f a Modern Social Security System
The enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935 did not quell the debate over how the 
implementation of a social insurance plan would affect the historic individualism of American 
society. Even after it had been signed into law, it was to remain a major issue of the presidential 
campaign during the next year. Republican candidate Alfred Landon alluded to the program as
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“a fraud on the working man. The savings it forces on our workers is a cruel hoax.” (Nash 1988) 
Bolstered by the citizens’ acceptance of a plan that alleviated their suffering and several Supreme 
Court rulings that established the power of the federal government to collect payroll taxes to such 
an end, Roosevelt went on to soundly defeat his Republican challenger that fall.
Only four years after being signed into law, the first of many subsequent amendments 
were added to its original framework. The original intent was to only insure the lost earning 
potential of wage earners and it was presupposed that these individuals would provide for the 
needs of their immediate family. However, it was overlooked that many individuals perished 
before they reached the age of retirement, thereby leaving their dependents without any access to 
their many years of contributions. The first of these amendments added benefits for survivors 
and dependents; the widows, children and other surviving family members of wage earners in 
order to circumvent the destitution that would surely result if no provisions were made.
Over the next several decades, other amendments were enacted to expand the reach of 
Social Security to eventually encompass virtually the entire working population. The original act 
covered only employees of established businesses in providing for a mandatory retirement 
benefit. As the program gained prominence and more workers became aware of the advantages 
of a guaranteed retirement stipend, lobbying efforts to expand the realm of coverage began. In 
1950, benefits were offered to all private sector employees not previously covered, state and 
local government employees not covered under an existing retirement plan, and self-employed 
individuals who were not farmers. Four years later, coverage was extended to all state and local 
government employees and farmers on an elective basis. Over the next decade, professional self- 
employed individuals such as physicians were offered the opportunity to enroll in the burgeoning 
program. In 1983, the last such expansion was undertaken with benefits being offered to 
employees of non-profit organizations and federal employees, including elected officials. 
Currently, over 90% of the work force is enrolled in social security. Only government
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employees who have chosen not to contribute or were covered under a previous plan and some 
low wage earners are not now covered by the largest of government programs (Nash 1988).
Over the first six decades of its existence, the growth of the social security system was 
not solely caused by the need supply stipends to an ever expanding roll of beneficiaries. Elected 
officials have also amended the original bill to provide for increasing amounts of benefits and 
have subsequently had to increase the bite on payroll taxes. The original estimation was that the 
fully funded system would ultimately require a five percent payroll deduction that would be 
equally split between employer and worker. However, the taxation rate has increased ten times 
since 1950 (Hull 1995). Currently the payroll tax rate stands at just under thirteen percent and 
many believe that in order to guarantee a basic level of support for future retirees, this rate will 
surely increase. By the calculations of one estimate, for all of the post World War II generation 
(Baby Boomers) to receive benefits comparable to the current levels, taxes on workers would 
need to rise to 45% of wages by the year 2030 (O’Reilly 1995). Remember again that the Social 
Security system is funded apart from the general taxation revenues of the federal government, so 
this figure does not include other marginal taxes on the federal, state, and local levels. A 
substantial amount of the benefit increases can be attributed to economic conditions that could 
not be foreseen in the original estimations; periods of economic growth, high inflation rates, 
recessions, and the like. However, there is also evidence that the early successes of the program 
created the enviable political position of increasing entitlements for constituents without 
seemingly impacting any other segment of society. Given the overwhelming ratio of workers to 
retirees during the initial decades of the program, Congress found it especially easy to raise 
benefits every few years while having only a minimal impact to the extremely healthy trust fund 
(Hull 1995). What was not foreseen, or was completely ignored, was the dangerous proposition 
of continually raising the level of entitlements that future generations would be expecting to 
receive.
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As the Social Security system has evolved into its current state, it has witnessed many 
monumental changes in the fabric of our society. The United States and the world were enduring 
the hardships of deplorable economic conditions when the original act was signed. Rampant 
unemployment, depleted savings accounts, and a general uncertainty about future livelihood were 
the rule rather than the exception. The nation readily accepted the promises of the Social 
Security Act; protection against the ravages of long term unemployment, providing for the 
welfare of their children when they could not, and a retirement stipend that could be used to ward 
off the destitution that awaited most of the elderly population. Less than a decade later, however, 
the United States had just defeated two formidable enemies and in doing so had replenished the 
demand for labor to provide for the military’s needs. The expansion of the economy continued 
as returning soldiers arrived with demands for more homes, automobiles, and other domestic 
goods. As more and more of these workers became employed, the Social Security system reaped 
the rewards of deducting a portion of these expanding payrolls.
The returning soldiers also summoned an increase in the demand for child rearing 
supplies. Our country experienced population growth rates that had never been seen prior to this 
period and have never been approached since. This “Baby Boomer” generation has accounted 
for a great deal of the subsequent economic development of our nation through the productive 
services they have rendered. In addition to the statis quo work force of the first part of this 
century, comprised mostly of white males, progressive legislation and enlightenment have 
extended employment opportunities to women and minorities. The expansion of this pool of 
labor has created many more participants in the Social Security system, all contributing to a 
growing trust fund and providing the means for increased payments to current beneficiaries.
The current Social Security Trust Fund can confidently boast about billions of dollars in 
reserves due to long years of favorable ratios of workers to beneficiaries. However, Social 
Security will always be a slave to demographics and this may ultimately prove to be the fatal
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blow to this American institution. The problems now being faced by the system cannot 
conceivably be solved within its current structure. The tax burden of today’s workers cannot be 
reduced because the revenues are needed to finance the benefits for the current stream of retirees 
(Ferrera 1985). The newer retirees are especially adamant about receiving their share of 
entitlements since they have effectively paid into the system from the start of their working lives. 
Receiving the same level of benefits as past recipients is only expected, even though these 
benefit levels were originally promised at a time when they could be delivered with minimal 
impact to the overall economy. The future benefits for today’s workers cannot be raised since 
maintaining even current stipend levels will be extremely difficult to finance. The impending 
problems can only be solved through real, fundamental reform, breaking from the traditions of 
the original system (Ferrera 1985).
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The Reasons Behind Personal Savings
The impact that compulsory social insurance has had on the savings activities of the 
general populace has been a bone of contention since the inception of Social Security. The 
problem in adequately measuring this impact is in trying to determine each individual’s motives 
for saving in the first place. Theoretically, workers aim to save current income for use at a later 
date in order to mitigate the risks that are inherent with an uncertain future. The Life Cycle 
Theory, proposed by Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani (1963), presumes savings and 
consumption activities are orchestrated during one’s working years in order to support 
consumption during retirement when a steady stream of income is no longer available (Ando and 
Modigliani 1963). The establishment of an estate to bequest to the next generation of heirs is the 
cornerstone of some savings plans. However, many individuals pass away while only leaving 
debts behind. Saving current income can also provide a method of consumption spreading to 
meet the demands of reduced future earnings and periods of accelerated consumption. College 
education for one’s children and providing a retirement nest egg are the major concerns for 
individuals with the foresight to devise such a plan. Lastly, individuals forego spending the 
entire amount of their income in order to guarantee that resources will be available for 
unpredictable circumstances they may encounter at some later date. Although very similar to the 
previous motive, there is no definite goal associated with such a plan, only the knowledge that 
life is full of expensive uncertainties (Munnell 1974).
The difficulty of determining the true motive behind a savings activity is compounded by 
the fact that individuals have different goals depending on what is of immediate concern during 
particular stages of their life. Younger families are preoccupied with the establishment of a
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household and the potential purchase of their own home. As individuals progress into the middle 
years of their life, the focus of their savings activities is often directed to ensuring the 
continuation of their children’s education at a college or university. Once these obligations have 
been met, it is only then that many individuals focus on the next major milestone of their lives, 
namely retirement (Munnell 1974). The immediacy of such important concerns and the litany of 
other uncertainties that befall an individual over the course of one’s lifetime ensure that personal 
preparations for retirement are most often woefully inadequate.
The impact that Social Security has had on these personal retirement preparations may 
also hinge on one of the key unresolved analytical issues in economics. We have assumed all 
along that each individual has a planning horizon that enables them to foresee future impacts to 
their income and orchestrate current consumption in order to meet these objectives. However, 
that may not be the case for even a majority of individuals (Aaron 1982). Until now, we have 
based our assumptions on the life cycle model of personal savings. People will base their 
decisions to save, offer their supply of labor and engage in other economic matters depending on 
the anticipated levels of lifetime wealth, earning potential, and the accumulation of interest and 
dividends on their savings. For many, a daily model may be a more accurate representation of 
their perceptions on the need to save. The planning horizon for these individuals stretches a few 
years, months, or even days ahead. The actions of government, such as compulsory social 
insurance, or events that will occur in the distant future have virtually no impact on their current 
economic behavior 
(Aaron 1982).
An extensive debate has taken place over whether Social Security has a
significant impact on capital formation and on the supply of labor. The
outcome of the debate, as far as I know is still in doubt (Nash 1988).
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Previous Attempts to Quantify Effect on Savings
The traditional argument contends that when individuals are assured a minimum level of 
retirement support, they will be more inclined to spend freely while they are working and worry 
less about saving for their golden years (Munnell 1974). This follows the neoclassical position 
on Social Security which asserts that individuals placed under a compulsory savings program 
will generally react by reducing their own private savings (Munnell 1974). In 1957, Dr. Henry 
Aaron conducted some of the earliest research on these interactions and found a highly 
significant negative relationship between savings rates and Social Security expenditures 
(Munnell 1974). He did caution against the assigning of a causal relationship and when 
regressions were run only a few years later, the signs remained negative but the variables were no 
longer significant.
In 1965, Phillip Cagan analyzed the savings behavior of over 15,000 members of the 
Consumer’s Union. Although not as scientifically rigorous as Dr. Aaron, he nonetheless 
concluded dhat compulsory insurance plans create a “recognition effect”. Individuals will be 
more prone to pay attention to the prospect of distant activity such as retirement if they are 
forced to worry about their future prospects at an earlier age (Munnell 1974). Therefore, the 
implementation of such programs as Social Security may actually prove to have a positive 
influence on the savings rate of a nation, although his findings proved to be inconclusive in this 
regard.
During the late sixties the Social Security Administration undertook a massive effort to 
survey the recipients of the past three decades on their personal savings habits. Evidence was 
gathered that seemed to verify the hypothesis that individuals retiring in the late 1960’s had 
saved more than their counterparts in the late 1930’s (Munnell 1974). These results are
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somewhat circumspect since the surveyors did not consider the economic and societal changes 
that had occurred in just these three decades alone. The inclusion of corporate retirement 
pensions, which gained enormous popularity only after the war, as a savings instrument is an 
indication that they were comparing vastly different periods of American history.
A few years later, Lester Taylor used quarterly national income data to conclude that the 
typical consumer views compulsory contributions as substitutes for their own personal savings 
and subsequently reduces these savings two dollars for every one dollar paid in payroll taxes 
(Munnell 1974). The results were met with staunch criticism due to the fact that he used 
aggregate spending on all social programs as a proxy for compulsory insurance and he assumed 
that individuals had a propensity to save .90 of every dollar that they had lost through transfer 
payments.
In 1974, Martin Feldstein conducted quite possibly the best known attempt to effectively 
quantify the impact that Social Security benefits have had on the nation’s savings patterns (Aaron 
1982). Based on extensive time series data, Dr. Feldstein concluded that the nation’s savings 
rate had been decreased by 38% due to such mandatory mechanisms as Social Security. Instead
of directly measuring the impact of the savings rate, he choose to perform regressions on 
consumer expenditures. Since consumption and savings are inversely related, a positive effect on 
current spending would be akin to a negative impact on savings, given that the variables were in
fact significant. This decision was also made in light of the fact that consumption data is more 
readily available and usually more concise than comparable data on savings rates. The rest of the 
equation included variables corresponding to disposable personal income, gross undistributed
corporate profits, per capita household net worth, and the present value of Social Security 
benefits. This last variable was found to be significant and raised the current consumption level 
by .38 units. However, the introduction of regular business cycle factors, such as the
unemployment rate, acted to reduce the affect that Social Security benefits had on consumption
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and deteriorated its statistical significance. This certainly raises questions about the true impact 
that a single input such as Social Security could have on the economy when more robust models 
are constructed.
From just this sampling of empirical studies, one can quickly see the difficulty in 
drawing a relevant conclusion about the direct effect compulsory insurance has had upon the 
national savings rate. While some results do conclude that such an interaction is statistically 
significant, the introduction of other relevant economic factors quickly diminished the seeming 
significance of their findings. There have been so many drastic changes that have come about in 
the economic and political framework of the United States over the course of the last sixty years. 
As a result, it is virtually impossible to conclude, with a large degree of confidence, that one 
single factor such as Social Security has had a significant affect on the savings rate over the 
course of this time.
Also impacting the validity of these results is the almost universal assumption that 
individuals would save regardless of the existence of compulsory measures such as Social
Security. If most individuals are personifications of the daily model of savings with the
extremely short planning horizons, then the implementation of the Social Security system may
have had no measurable effect on their established habit of avoiding the saving of a portion of
their disposable income. In fact, as Philip Cagan earlier asserted, the existence of a mandatory
contribution system may have at least enlightened a great many people that retirement is a
concern worth noting.
Perhaps the most popular notion advanced to justify Social Security is 
the claim that without the program people will not provide for retirement of 
other insurance contingencies. People are short-sided, the argument goes, 
and will not think far enough ahead to provide adequately for retirement.
At most this justifies only a simple requirement that all individuals save 
some portion of their income for retirement and other contingencies, but 
not necessarily through Social Security. Individuals could instead be allowed 
to choose among private alternatives, just as drivers in most states are 
required to carry car insurance but can choose to purchase it from any 
of many private insurers (Ferrara 1985).
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Critique of Established Models
Martin Feldstein garnered the most attention, as well as the most criticism, for his 
estimation techniques in gauging the true impact of Social Security on the level of personal 
savings. Feldstein builds the foundation for his model with the belief that savings, or negative 
consumption as he defines, should be positively correlated to the level of disposable personal 
income that a person earns in the course of a given year. In addition, he also presupposes that 
accumulated personal net wealth will have a negative influence on the desire of an individual to 
save a larger proportion of their income (Elmeskov 1991). Since the savings instrument is 
predominantly utilized to mitigate the effects of future uncertainties, a base of considerable 
wealth could presumably also be used for the same purpose. Therefore, the accumulation of net 
wealth in its various states of liquidity should have a negative effect on the savings patterns of an 
individual.
Utilizing this logic, Feldstein further asserts that future Social Security benefits are
considered as wealth by the majority of American citizens (Elmeskov 1991). Even though most 
working citizens will receive no tangible benefits from Social Security until they reach the 
mandated age of retirement, the government’s assurances of a stipend is considered to be part of 
their accumulated wealth in much the same way as established investments or owned real estate. 
Feldstein goes on to identify the primary independent variable in his model as Social Security 
wealth and bases his findings on its significance. His preliminary hypothesis presupposes that 
this variable will be significant and positively correlated with the dependent variable which is 
consumer expenditures. Since it can confidently be assumed that individuals will either expend 
or save their disposable income, the positive influence on the consumer expenditure rate is to be 
regarded as a negative impact on the personal savings rate.
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Feldstein’s model ultimately hinged on how he defined the variable corresponding to 
Social Security wealth. While the benefits received by each of today’s retirees can be calculated 
with some degree of precision, it is exceedingly difficult to determine what stipends await future 
generations of retirees. Retirement benefits are composed of a worker’s personal income history, 
the age at which they will begin collecting these benefits, and the legislation that governs the 
Social Security Administration at the time the stream of benefits are initiated. This simplistic 
summary fails to take into consideration such exogenous factors as political influences, the 
health of the trust fund, and rising price levels over the course of one’s employment history. 
Ultimately, a great many assumptions are necessitated by the gross uncertainty of the general 
state of the Social Security system at any given time in the future. In addition, each individual’s 
circumstances could be vastly different in regards to both assumed Social Security wealth and its 
effect on their personal savings habits. In order to aggregate this data to establish an overall 
impact on the national savings rate, further assumptions need to be made in establishing an 
“average” beneficiary or weighted sum of all beneficiaries.
Feldstein ultimately built this critical variable by multiplying the real personal disposable 
income in a given year by a constant benefit ratio and further multiplied the resulting figure by 
the weighted sum of persons covered under the system (Elmeskov 1991). This last portion of the 
equation is based upon future projections of age, sex and marital status. The subsequent 
regressions revealed that this manufactured variable was indeed significant and increased the 
dependent variable of consumer expenditures on the order of 38%. However, the significance 
was shown to be fragile at best. Two Social Security Administration economists, Dean Leimer 
and Selig Lesnoy (1982), later refined the model, in particular adjusting the Social Security 
wealth variable to correspond to the agency’s established practice of estimating future benefit 
levels (Aaron 1982). This central cog in Feldstein’s model became insignificant when exposed 
to these small refinements. Further model adjustments that aimed to include cyclical influences
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of the economy, proxied by the unemployment rate, and estimated for different periods of Social 
Security's existence also deteriorated the significance of the variable corresponding to assumed 
Social Security wealth.
The model developed by Feldstein had as its central argument that an individual's future 
anticipation of Social Security benefits would impact their current habits in regards to saving 
disposable income for retirement. The complicated nature by which future benefits were 
determined illustrates a fundamental problem in ultimately determining this impact. One must 
assume that individuals would have a basic idea of their future levels of benefits in order to 
properly orchestrate their current savings levels to compensate for this future level of wealth. If 
numerous economists holding advanced degrees from the finest institutions in the country cannot 
begin to agree on the basic construction of these future benefits, it is not exceedingly obvious 
that the average American worker can clearly curtail their spending habits by an amount equal to 
this predicted future Social Security wealth. The tenuous nature of this variable also illustrates 
the effect that such exogenous occurrences as business cycle fluctuations can have on 
determining the true impact of Social Security on the personal savings rate of this country.
Shortly after the publication of Feldstein’s controversial results, Alicia Munnell 
constructed a model that aimed to account for the induced retirement effect of Social Security, an 
item that was notably absent in his model (Yon Furstenberg 1979). Munnell based her model, 
much as Feldstein had previously, on the basic Ando-Modigliani function which defined savings 
as being most influenced by disposable income and net wealth (Munnell 1974). However, 
Munnell went a step further and also utilized the components of the recently theorized expanded 
function which included such variables as lagged net wealth, long term interest rates, inflation 
rate, and the unemployment rate. Munnell’s final model consisted of the dependent variable of 
per capita savings regressed against per capita disposable income, urban work force, 
unemployment rate, private wealth lagged one period, Social Security contributions, percent of
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work force affected by compulsory retirement, percent of work force covered by private 
pensions, and percent subject to Social Security benefits test (Munnell 1974).
One last variable was of foremost importance to the resulting equation and that was the 
ratio of retirement years to the sum of retirement years and working years. Central to Munnell’s 
argument was the premise that Social Security induced an earlier age of retirement and therefore 
could influence the savings rate since workers would have to finance a longer period of forced 
unemployment. The inclusion of the Social Security contributions variable established a base 
upon which workers were expected to build a nest egg and the dependent variable could 
conceivably be affected in any number of ways.
Robert Barro (1978) expanded the original variable selection to account for the effects of 
past events in molding the savings behavior of individuals in the present (Yon Furstenberg 1979). 
Barro introduced a simpler measure of Social Security wealth that was radically different from 
those used previously. He simply multiplied the average benefits received per participant in the 
system by a ratio of the workers covered by Social Security to the total work force. This gave an 
aggregate measure of wealth not dependent on a wide range of assumptions about the future, that 
was also weighted to more precisely estimate its impact upon the overall economy.
Barro included in his model several additional lagged variables in order to create a more 
dynamic model that was designed to show not just the effects of present wealth accumulation, 
but also the effects of past decisions. Consumer expenditures was once again the dependent 
variable and the independent variables included disposable personal income both current and 
lagged one period, household net worth lagged one period, stock of household durable goods 
currently and lagged one period. Two additional variables were included in the model to 
measure the effects of the cyclical nature of our economy. One such variable was derived by 
multiplying personal disposable income by the unemployment rate, presumably to show the true 
affects of lost wages that could have also been utilized in the pursuit of personal savings goals.
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Barro also included the government surplus or deficit for each year as a broad measure of the 
savings behavior of the federal government. The introduction of this variable brings to light the 
assumption that an individual's savings behavior may be modeled to a large extent after the 
spending patterns of the government. If citizens are convinced that the government is not 
worried about future uncertainties as evidenced by continuing budget deficits, these individuals 
may not feel the necessary impetus to provide for their own future.
Michael Darby (1979) was another economist that found fault with Feldstein’s model 
and constructed his own through the introduction of more exotic variables. Central to Darby’s 
argument was the fact that the decision to save was ultimately based on individual circumstances 
confronting each participant in the economy. He delineated between a measure of permanent 
income, what one could be expected to earn through the course of their working life, and 
transitory income, current income which might be considerably less if the individual had not yet 
attained their expected employment potential (Von Furstenberg 1979). Darby also thought that 
the majority of an average citizen’s wealth would be displayed through their ownership of 
durable goods and their personal savings decisions rested upon their ability to further their stock 
of these goods. To illustrate this effect he included variables corresponding to the stock of 
consumer’s durable goods lagged one period and the ratio of durable goods prices to non-durable 
goods prices.
In order to gauge the impact of the economy on the personal savings rate, variables for
the Ml money stock and the nominal rate of long term government bonds were also included in 
his calculations. The latter variable also introduced an alternative savings instrument that could 
further validate the correctness of the signs in the model as regressed against the dependent 
variable, which in his case was consumer expenditures. Finally, Darby included a measure of 
Social Security wealth closely resembling the construction in Feldstein’s model.
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What each of these subsequent models has in common is that their findings did nothing 
to validate those originally found by Feldstein (Von Furstenberg 1979). To a large extent many 
of the variables followed their presumable course, more net wealth and stocks of private goods 
negatively affecting the savings rate while more disposable income had a positive impact. 
However, the large negative impact of expected Social Security wealth, so noticeable in 
Feldstein’s groundbreaking study, was not to be found in any of these subsequent studies. In 
fact, the variable corresponding to an expected retirement stipend had no significant effect upon 
their given models whatsoever.
The ambiguity of these results further illustrates the difficulty in determining the effect 
of one variable such as expected Social Security wealth on the aggregate personal savings rate of 
the entire nation. The difficulty in establishing one accepted measure of Social Security wealth 
was also evidenced in the differing methodologies utilized by just this small handful of 
economists. The conclusions that may be made are that depending upon the composition of the 
Social Security wealth variable, the influence can be highly significant as shown by Feldstein or 
non-existent as presented by this team of critics. Furthermore, even when the variable is found to 
be significant, it is a tenuous position that can be affected by outside influences such as the 
nation’s unemployment rate.
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Development of the Model
Each of the previous attempts at quantifying the effect of Social Security on personal 
savings developed their models with the assumption that individuals would forego current 
savings due to their knowledge about future levels of benefits to be received. Only Barro 
constructed a variable that questioned an individual’s ability to assimilate the complicated 
material in deriving this future benefits figure. He instead assumed individuals utilize knowledge 
of today’s Social Security factors in order to orchestrate their savings behavior. In developing 
my own model, I seriously doubted that the average citizen had the necessary information to 
predict future benefits and thereby arrange current savings to account for this guaranteed stipend. 
Given that the models were also burdened with many assumptions that made the resulting 
calculations extremely circumspect, I did not feel that another venture into trying to determine 
future benefits would yield any valuable insights.
Many individuals assume that their monthly contributions to Social Security are being 
put aside into a separate “savings” account, labeled by their Social Security number, that can 
only be accessed once they alone reach the mandated age of retirement. Even if an individual 
realizes that their contributions are immediately paid out in benefits to today’s retirees, they are 
still influenced by the standard of living attained by the current multitude of beneficiaries. 
Family members and close friends that are living out of poverty’s reach in large part due to this 
steady stream of benefits, may have a strong influence on the current worker who will assume 
that they also will be accorded the same basic standard of living once the age of retirement is 
attained. Furthermore, news of the Social Security system and its burgeoning trust fund can be
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accessed with relative ease and may have an additional effect on the perceptions of today’s work 
force and the role of Social Security in their retirement plans.
All in all, the true impact of Social Security on the savings behavior of workers is 
probably not found in some abstract measure of future benefits constructed using many 
assumptions that may never materialize. Instead, the effect of Social Security is best quantified 
by the perceptions of today’s work force as they evaluate the relative benefits afforded to today’s 
retirees. It is through evaluating the current stream of benefits, contributions to the system, and 
relative health of the trust fund that individuals are apt to make current decisions on how best to 
prepare for their own future.
The evaluation of current Social Security measures of contributions, benefits, and the 
surplus of such transactions will have a significant effect on the personal savings habits of the 
nation. If found to be significant, these variables will be negatively correlated with the savings 
rate as individuals make the assumption that current trends will continue and their retirement will 
at least be partly financed by the Social Security system.
Definition of Variables
In developing a model that would quantify the effects of Social Security on private 
savings it is important to determine what other factors may also influence this consumer 
behavior. Utilizing the results of the previous work performed by Feldstein, Munnell, Darby, 
Barro, and others it is imperative to include such variables that could affect an individual’s 
overall outlook on the economy or at least their personal ability to save.
The model was constructed to encompass two different investment strategies; low risk 
and high risk. The base of all regressions was comprised of the following variables: Net Wealth, 
Federal Spending, Labor-Retiree Ratio, Unemployment Rate, Personal Income, and Personal
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Savings. For the first half of the regressions the lower risk investment alternatives were also 
included among the independent variables; Long Term Bonds, Corporate Bonds - AAA Rating, 
and Corporate Bonds - BAA Rating. The rest of the regressions included the higher risk 
investment indicators as independent variables; Dow Jones Average and S&P 500 Index. The 
investment types were segregated to gain a better understanding about the effects of different 
strategies on savings behavior as well as to accommodate the availability of different periods of 
data.
The rest of the independent variables used in the model correspond to different measures 
of the effects of Social Security. Previous models had tried to determine the effects by deriving a 
future benefit expectation based on complicated calculations and fragile assumptions. Instead of 
repeating this course, personal savings habits are assumed to be molded by what information 
individuals can expect to assimilate today. For this reason I constructed the Social Security 
variables to correspond to knowledge that would be at the disposal of most any individual. 
These variables are presented as aggregate Social Security Income, aggregate Social Security 
Outlays, and Social Security Wealth as measured as the difference between income and outlays.
The final construction of the model occurs as each base regression includes one of the 
Social Security factors as an additional independent variable. A total of six regressions are run; 
three for the low risk investment alternatives to include each Social Security factor and three for 
the high risk investment alternatives to include each Social Security factor. A more detailed 
account of each regression and their associated empirical results are included in the next section. 
Thus the following model is estimated:
Low - Risk Investment Alternatives:
PS = f ( NW, SSI, FS, RLR, UR, PI, LTB, CRA, CRR)
PS = f (NW, SSO, FS, RLR, UR, PI, LTB, CBA, CBB) 
PS = f (NW, SSS, FS, RLR, UR, PI, LTB, CBA, CBB)
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High - Risk Investment Alternatives:
PS = f ( NW, SSI, FS, RLR, UR, PI, DJ, SP) 
PS = f (NW, SSO, FS, RLR, UR, PI, DJ, SP) 
PS = f (NW, SSS, FS, RLR, UR, PI, DJ, SP)
The expected signs for each of these variables are included in the following variable 
descriptions. Since quite a few of the anticipated signs require considerable explanation, this is 
more sufficiently addressed within the framework of these descriptions.
Net Wealth (NW): Personal net wealth defined as both financial and tangible holdings 
at the end of a given year. Wealth accumulation is central to subsequent decisions on the value 
of continued saving especially for such long range goals as retirement. As previously stated, a 
large reserve of wealth would predictably decrease the personal savings activities of an 
individual. This occurs since savings is seen as an instrument to mitigate future uncertainties and 
already possessing an adequate nest egg would allow the individual to fulfill other needs with the 
confidence that they are not dangerously close to poverty. Therefore, a negative relationship 
should be expected between this variable and personal savings. Data was supplied by the 
Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars. 
Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form for the entire nation.
Federal Spending (FS): The difference between federal income gained through taxes 
and federal outlays provided to programs and to pay the interest on the national debt may affect 
personal savings habits in any number of ways. Although Social Security is a government 
program, its annual outlays are considered “off-budget” and are not included within this variable, 
which only accounts for spending financed by the general revenues. From a symbolic point of 
view, citizens may view the government’s reluctance to live within their own means as a 
disregard for future uncertainties or an abject confidence that the future will take care of itself.
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Citizens could therefore be expected to emulate the actions of government and give little regard 
to their own preparations for the future. Conversely, the continued borrowing by the federal 
government to finance the deficit has a “crowding out” effect for private borrowers, effectively 
raising the price of available funds for their own financial needs. The effects of this are often 
hard to predict; increased costs to businesses and decreased business growth could result or a 
more inviting savings environment due to the subsequent increase in interest rates may occur. I 
look for this variable to have a negative impact on the savings behavior as citizens become 
indifferent to their future and businesses are adversely affected by loss of affordable financial 
capital. Data was supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is 
presented in 1987 base year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Ratio of Labor to Retirement (RLR): This variable was constructed by dividing the 
total labor force (over 16 years of age) by the population of the country that is over the age of 65. 
The resulting figure is a measure of approximately how many workers can be expected to support 
each former labor force member as they enter the age of retirement and begin to receive Social 
Security benefits. Although practically the entire work force is presently covered by Social 
Security, this variable should be considered a proxy since this has not always been the case. The 
ratio variable will most likely be negative as more workers contributing to an individual’s 
retirement stipend allows for the relative ease of increasing current benefits. This could 
adversely affect the preparations for retirement by today’s work force as they would come to 
expect the same pattern of benefit increases during their own golden years. Data was supplied by 
the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars. 
Data covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Unemployment Rate (UR): The measure of labor force participants unable to find 
gainful employment during a given year is one good indicator of the relative health of an
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economy during this period. Feldstein was sharply criticized for omitting this variable in his 
original model and its later inclusion did seem to call into question many of his findings. This 
variable will be included as a lesson learned from his experiences as well as to build confidence 
in the correctness of my model. One would suspect that the unemployment rate would have a 
largely negative impact upon the personal savings habits of a country. When an individual is 
unemployed, much of their attention is directed to fulfilling daily needs, rather than building a 
healthy retirement nest egg. Data was supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994 
Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Personal Income (PI): The amount of disposable personal income at one’s disposal is a 
powerful agent in predicting the amount of savings activity that can be expected. When 
disposable personal income is regressed against the dependent variable of personal savings, the 
resulting figure should be a positive ratio of marginal income put towards savings. The resulting 
changes in this marginal propensity to save, a valuable tool in analyzing a nation’s overall 
savings habits, could prove just as valuable in gauging the effects of other independent variables 
in the model. As income increases, we should expect the marginal propensity to save to also 
increase as more discretionary income is now at the consumer’s disposal. Data was supplied by 
the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars. 
Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form for the entire nation.
Personal Savings (PS): The dependent variable within the model, it is a measure of the 
national household savings accumulated through such instruments as bank accounts, bonds and 
investments. It is through the effects upon this variable that I aim to quantify the impact of 
various factors of Social Security and determine the interrelationships of various other important 
economic variables in developing an accurate representation of savings habits. Data was
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supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base
year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form for the entire nation.
Long Term Treasury Bonds (LTB): The yield on the thirty-year government bond for 
each annual period over the course of this time series data set. The variable is represented as the 
percentage gain in yield during a given year as measured against the previous year’s yield. 
Considered the safest of all investment vehicles, its inclusion in the model is to determine any 
direct affects between percentage changes in the rates of return and personal savings habits. The 
expected sign for this variable is positive due to the relationship between increased expected 
returns and a more favorable outlook upon investment as an alternative to merely holding money. 
Data was supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and covers the years 
1948 to 1993.
Corporate Bonis - AAA Rating (CBA): The yield on the highest quality corporate 
bonds issued in the economy. The variable is represented as the percentage change in yield for a 
given year as measured against the previous year’s yield. Due to the stability of the issuing 
companies, these investment instruments are considered only slightly riskier than bonds backed 
by the full faith and credit of the federal government. Still, there does exist some risk and 
therefore higher yields will be offered to entice potential buyers. Predicting a positive influence 
on the personal savings of the nation if this variable is found to be significant. Data was supplied 
by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Corporate Bonds - BAA Rating (CBB): The yield on lesser quality corporate bonds 
issued by companies that may be in distress or heavily leveraged in debt. The variable is 
represented as the percentage gain in yield for a given year as measured against the previous 
year’s yield. Still considered investment grade issues, however, with the increased risk of 
ownership comes an even greater potential for investment gains. A positive influence should
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develop between the expected gains on these corporate bonds and the personal savings rate, if the 
relationship is statistically significant. Data was supplied by the Economic Report to the 
President (1994 Edition) and covers the years 1948 to 1993.
Dow Jones Average (DJ): This variable is a compilation of the prices of the thirty 
largest publicly traded companies that comprise this stock index. The variable is represented as 
the percentage change in the index for a given year as measured against the previous year's 
index. Another indication of the effect of alternative savings instruments with regards to 
personal savings habits, this stock index is quite a bit more riskier than the bond issues and 
therefore one would expect a greater return for their investment over the long run. A positive 
relationship between this variable and personal savings should develop as higher expected 
returns will entice greater amounts of income to be invested. Data was supplied by the Economic 
Report to the President (1994 Edition) and covers the years 1955 to 1993.
S&P 500 Index (SP): Another stock price index, this variable is a compilation of the 
500 largest publicly traded companies. The variable is represented as the percentage change in 
the index for a given year as measured against the previous year’s index. With the inclusion of 
many more volatile companies, this stock index is the riskiest investment measure in the model 
and should have a positive impact upon the overall personal savings habits of the nation. Data 
was supplied by the Economic Report to the President (1994 Edition) and covers the years 1955 
to 1993.
Social Security Income (SSI): Measure of the total amount of contributions received 
by the Social Security Administration during each year encompassed by the time series data. As 
individuals pay into the system through the mandated payroll deduction, many are gaining the 
sense that they are putting away for their own future instead of actually funding today’s 
retirement rolls. This insistence that preparations are already being made for their future should
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have a negative impact on the personal savings variable as individuals will be reluctant to
duplicate this effort. Data was supplied by the Budget of the United States (1994 Edition) and is 
presented in 1987 base year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form 
for the entire nation.
Social Security Outlays (SSW): The amount of aggregate payments made to eligible 
retirees for any given year in this time series. Today’s workers are assumed to be affected by the 
amount of retirement benefits being guaranteed to retirees as well as the total amount paid out in 
any given year. The predicted result will be a negative impact upon savings plans as employees 
take for granted that the same stream of benefits will be available when they retire. Data was 
supplied by the Budget of the United States (1994 Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year 
dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in aggregate form for the entire nation.
Social Security Surplus (SSS): A measure of the difference between the income gained 
by the Social Security Administration and the amount paid out in the form of benefits to current 
retirees. News about the relative health of the Social Security Trust Fund may create a false 
sense of security and lull many to forego alternative strategies in building retirement savings. 
The predicted affect will be a negative impact upon personal savings if this variable does prove 
to be statistically significant. Data was supplied by the Budget of the United States (1994 
Edition) and is presented in 1987 base year dollars. Data covers the years 1948 to 1993 and is in 
aggregate form for the entire nation.
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CHAPTER V: EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF MODEL
REGRESSION #1
Dependent R-Squared: Adj R-Squared: Durbin-W atson:
Variable: .9103 .8815 1.990
Personal Savings
Intercept 153.80 .6197 No No
Net Wealth -0.039 .0009 Yes Yes
Soc Sec Income -1.415 .0210 Yes Yes
Federal Spending -0.448 .0201 Yes Yes
Labor-Retirees 13.339 .8516 No No
Unemployment Rate -28.102 .0001 Yes Yes
Personal Income 0.313 .0001 Yes Yes
Long Term Bonds 140.534 .4800 No No
Corporate Bonds - A -601.630 .1152 No No
Corporate Bonds - B 226.995 .3121 No No
Summary: The most significant variables, Net Wealth, Federal Spending, Unemployment Rate, 
and Personal Income all have the anticipated signs. The Personal Income variable’s estimated 
parameter may be interpreted as the marginal propensity to save, in the case of this model 
individuals would be expected to save approximately 31% of their marginal income. 
Interestingly enough, the Social Security Income variable is highly significant and corresponds to 
lessening personal savings by 1.415 units for every unit increase, a much more substantial impact 
than the findings of Feldstein’s model had originally suggested. None of the alternative savings 
instruments appear to have a significant affect on personal savings according to the results, 
although the higher quality corporate bond issues are almost significant at the 10% level.
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REGRESSION #2
Dependent Variable: R-Squared: Adj R-Squared: Durbin-W atson :
Personal Savings .8969 .8638 1.656
Intercept 282.713 .3882 No f'ig
Net Wealth -0.053 .0001 Yes Yt.
Soc Sec Outlays -1.372 .2213 No No
Federal Spending -0.4813 .0291 Yes Ye.
Labor-Retirees -13.159 .8614 No No
Unemployment Rate -21.212 .0036 Yes Yes
Personal Income .3409 .0001 Yes Yes
Long Term Bonds 191.404 .3684 No No
Corporate Bonds - A -566.959 .1671 No No
Corporate Bonds - B 180.911 .4606 No No
Summary: Net Wealth, Federal Spending, and the Unemployment Rate are highly significant 
and negatively impact the level of personal savings, as was predicted before the model was run. 
Personal Income is also highly significant and parlays into a marginal propensity to save of 
approximately 34%. The variable corresponding to Social Security Outlays is not significant so 
we have little confidence that the resulting substantial negative impact is indeed statistically 




Dependent R-Squared: Adj R-Squared: Durbin-W atson:
Variable: .9045 .8738 2.170
Personal Savings
^VariTble"4 p£ Z £ r Prol>>T
'
5% Msl io1̂ 1 dt
Intercept 248.330 .4281 No Ho
Net Wealth -0.037 .0035 Yes Yes
Soc Sec Surplus -1.428 .0577 No Y(
Federal Spending -0.342 .0767 No Yes
Labor-Retirees 9.959 .8925 No No
Unemployment Rate -32.672 .0001 Yes Yes
Personal Income 0.2300 .0001 Yes Yt.
Long Term Bonds 138.256 .5018 No No
Corporate Bonds - A -666.084 .0923 No Yes
Corporate Bonds - B 293.476 .2099 No No
Summary: Net Wealth, Unemployment Rate, and Personal Income are all highly significant and 
have the anticipated signs. The Personal Income variable may be interpreted as the marginal 
propensity to save, in the case of this model individuals would be expected to save approximately 
23% of their marginal income. This is considerably less than the marginal propensity to save 
viewed when modeling the effects of Social Security Income or Outlays. The Social Security 
Surplus variable is considered significant at the 10% level of confidence and the reduction in the 
marginal propensity to save may also be attributed to the effects of this variable since it was the 
only one changed from the previous regressions. The Federal Spending variable remains 
significant, although at a diminished level. The variable corresponding to high quality corporate 




Dependent R-Squared: Adj R-Squared: Durbin-Watson:
Variable: .8944 .8653 2.206
Personal Savings
^ V ariab lr* t̂hnalr sigi r at Si“  a t
Intercept 411.852 .1799 No No
Net Wealth -0.045 .0010 Yes Yes
Soc Sec Income -0.888 .1882 No No
Federal Spending -0.345 .0955 Yes No
Labor-Retirees -53.254 .4460 No No
Unemployment Rate -22.406 .0003 Yes Yes
Personal Income 0.306 .0001 Yes Yes
Dow Jones Ave 148.434 .3472 No No
S&P 500 Index -7.342 .9653 No No
Summary; The Net Wealth and Unemployment Rate variables are both highly significant and 
have the anticipated signs. The Personal Income variable is also statistically significant and may 
be interpreted as individuals being likely to save 31% of each additional unit of income. The 
variable corresponding to Social Security Income is not significant, while the variable 
corresponding to Federal Spending is marginally significant. Neither of the alternative savings 
instruments, in this case the riskier endeavors on the stock market, appear to have a significant 
affect on personal savings according to the results.
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REGRESSION #5
Dependent R-Squared: Adj R-Squared: Durbin-W atson:
Variable: .8942 .8651 2.035
Personal Savings
“ S t " PEstimater
Prob > T
^igni5 % n t 31
Significant at
Intercept 453.370 .1326 No No
Net Wealth -0.057 .0001 Yes Yes
Soc Sec Outlays -1.420 .1954 No No
Federal Spending -0.394 .0746 No Yes
Labor-Retirees -66.767 .3372 No No
Unemployment Rate -17.144 .0109 Yes Yes
Personal Income 0.3651 .0001 Yes Yes
Dow Jones Ave 111.198 .4590 No No
S&P 500 Index 43.586 .7819 No No
Summary: The Net Wealth and Unemployment Rate variable are both highly significant and
had the anticipated negative effects. The Personal Income variable is also statistically significant 
and may be interpreted as the individuals having a propensity to save close to 37% of each 
additional unit of income. The variable corresponding to Social Security Outlays is not 
significant, however, the marginal propensity to save is increased from the level attained when 
modeling Social Security Income. The addition of this variable could have had a lesser 
dampening effect on the propensity to save since this was the only variable changed. The 
Federal Spending variable is marginally significant and has the anticipated negative affect. 
Neither of the riskier alternative savings instruments appear to have a significant affect on 
personal savings according to the results.
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REGRESSION #6
Dependent R-Squared: Adj R-Squared: Durbin-Watson:
Variable: .8892 .8586 2.243
Personal Savings
f e t o a i r  P r o b > T
Significant at 
5% 10%
Intercept 490.434 .1136 No No
Net Wealth -0.050 .0010 Yes Ye
Soc Sec Surplus -0.449 .5609 No No
Federal Spending -0.273 .1789 No No
Labor-Retirees -58.758 .4141 No No
Unemployment Rate -23.275 .0010 Yes Yes
Personal Income 0.2691 .0001 Yes Yes
Dow Jones Ave 100.773 .5217 No No
S&P 500 Index 50.949 .7619 No No
Summary: Net Wealth and the Unemployment Rate variable are both highly significant and 
have the anticipated negative signs. The Personal Income variable is also statistically significant 
and may be interpreted as individuals being likely to save 27% of each additional unit of income. 
The variable corresponding to Social Security Surplus is not significant. However, the marginal 
propensity to save is slightly changed from the level attained when modeling straight Social 
Security Outlays or Income. The addition of this variable could have negatively impacted the 
propensity to save since this was the only variable changed in this particular regression. Neither 
of the riskier savings instruments appear to have a significant affect on personal savings 
according to the results.
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Review o f Overall Empirical Results
In drawing any conclusions from the results of the model, it is important to first analyze 
the similarities that are evident throughout all the regressions and then detail any substantial 
differences. Each of these regressions contained a basic compliment of variables that were 
specifically chosen as economic factors that presumably had an effect on the savings patterns of 
the country. Of these basic variables, two remained highly significant throughout all of the 
regressions. We cannot, with a high degree of certainty, reject the notion that the level of net 
personal wealth and the unemployment rate had a significant impact upon overall personal 
savings levels.
The effects of the unemployment rate seem somewhat obvious. An individual that is 
confronted with the prospect of not receiving a steady stream of income becomes much more 
concerned with the daily challenges of life rather than the prospects of saving for a comfortable 
retirement. Returning to our original discussion of savings behavior, these individuals exemplify 
the daily cycle of living; that is preparations are only made for the immediate future until some 
semblance of solidity returns to their income stream. The impact of the unemployment rate did 
appear to be quite substantial. For every one percent increase in the annual unemployment rate 
for the nation, aggregate personal savings could be expected to decrease from a low of $21 
billion to a high of $33 billion in constant 1987 figures. As a proxy for the general health of the 
economy, when the economy grows and the labor pool expands, we can expect more disposable 
income to be available for such discretionary items as personal savings.
The impact of accumulated net wealth also seemed to effect personal savings along the 
predicted course. The variable corresponding to net personal wealth remained highly significant 
during the course of the entire model and had a negative impact on savings. For every one 
billion dollar increase in net wealth holdings, personal savings levels could be expected to
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decrease from a low of $37 million to a high of $57 million in constant 1987 figures. The 
witnessed impact is almost exactly that which was predicted, as wealth is accumulated the further 
need to prepare for future uncertainties through savings becomes diminished. The ratio of wealth 
accumulation to savings reduction is approximately 3-5%, depending on the composition of the 
other independent variables. One may conclude that building larger reserves diminishes the need 
for savings, but every one unit increase in net wealth holdings does not correspond to a reduction 
in savings by an equal amount. Instead, some forms of wealth may act as substitutes, however it 
will take quite a bit of wealth to fully mitigate the preparation for any future uncertainties.
The effect of the federal balance sheet is a little less intuitively obvious. For the 
majority of the years represented in the time series data, the federal government spent more 
money than it received through taxes and otherwise (Appendix 2). Therefore, over this time 
period the citizens of this country have grown accustomed to the government disregarding 
predictions that such wanton spending habits could burden future generations with an 
irrepressible debt load and the associated interest payments. I hypothesized that citizens 
witnessing these spending habits over the course of several decades would began to emulate the 
government and become confident that the future will take care of itself. Whether this is indeed 
the case, the resulting data points to the fact that federal spending patterns over the course of the 
past 45 years have had a detrimental effect on personal savings habits. For every one billion 
dollar increase in the federal deficit for a given year, the accumulated personal savings could be 
expected to decrease between 273 and 481 million dollars as measured in constant 1987 terms. 
However, considering the fact that three of the six regressions yielded a marginally significant 
variable, and in one regression the variable did not appear significant, confidence that this is 
actually the effect of federal spending is somewhat diminished.
Of the other basic variables used within the model, the ratio of labor force to retirees did 
not seem to have a statistically significant effect in any of the cases. For each of these
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regressions, a negative impact was witnessed. That is, for each additional worker to retiree on
average, the level of savings would decrease by several units. However, without achieving a 
level of statistical confidence, we cannot be sure that there was a measurable effect on savings 
with respect to this factor.
The model was segregated into two distinctly different classes; variables corresponding 
to low risk investments and those corresponding to more riskier endeavors. Interestingly enough, 
only one of these variables proved to be significant at an acceptable level of confidence. The 
implication being that for the most part personal savings strategies were not affected one way or 
the other by the percentage change in yield of index holdings from one year to the next. This 
may seem dramatically different as to what one would expect and what has been decreed by 
economic theory. Namely, when investment alternatives become more profitable than merely 
holding money, consumers will opt for the interest bearing strategies. However, what may have 
been overlooked is the simple fact that most individual’s investment decisions are formulated on 
the basis of specific securities and bond issues. Even though the nightly news welcomes us every 
evening with the latest developments in the Dow Jones Average, it is still merely an index and 
one cannot invest their money directly into its coffers. Instead, investment decisions are made on 
the basis of experiences with individual stocks and bonds and it is their respective yields that 
may prove to be a more significant force in molding the savings behavior of a great many people. 
The aggregate measures utilized within the body of the model may have done little overall to 
influence investor decisions one way or another and this effect is further verified by the 
insignificance of the variables.
One variable corresponding to an investment alternative did appear to be relatively 
significant in one of the regressions, and the results were not at all what had been expected. In 
Regression #3, the variable corresponding to percentage change in yields for the higher quality 
corporate bonds is found to be significant at the 10% level. What is most interesting is that a
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large negative impact upon savings is determined to occur as the corporate issues increase in 
yield over the preceding year’s baseline. Savings could be expected to decline by $6.6 billion for 
every one percent increase in yield over the preceding year. Why savings would decline in the 
face of an investment that is becoming more lucrative is not readily apparent. The increase in 
yield from one year to the next may be an indication of other factors that are not particularly 
obvious from just this basic model. Corporate bonds usually are forced to increase their yields in 
order to compensate for greater risk, however, and investors may not have feel confident buying 
more issues during these tumultuous times and may decide to forego savings altogether. The 
most important factor for these conservative investors could be the relative stability of their 
chosen savings instrument, rather than significant changes in yield from one year to the next.
The focus of the model was to determine the effect that different factors of Social 
Security have had upon the personal savings habits of the country. In order to quantify this 
effect, variables were used corresponding to Social Security income, outlays and surplus. The 
original hypothesis was that current levels of these variables would affect the current savings 
behavior of today’s workers as they incorrectly assumed that they were providing for their own 
retirement nest egg or that the current stream of benefits are guaranteed for their future 
retirement. Interestingly enough, only two of the regressions yielded a significant Social 
Security variable, as evidenced in Regression #1 and Regression #3. In the model corresponding 
to the low risk investment alternatives, Social Security Income appeared statistically significant 
at the 5% level of confidence. What this means is that we have some level of confidence that the 
null hypothesis in this case cannot be rejected, and that the contributions current workers make 
into the system may indeed have an impact upon the aggregate personal saving levels for the 
nation. This could provide some evidence that many workers are under the false pretense that 
their personal Social Security contributions are a form of savings for their retirement and they 
will forego alternative strategies due to this belief.
In the next example, the variable corresponding to the difference between aggregate 
Social Security Income and Outlays was found to be significant at the 10% level of confidence. 
Although we are slightly less assured that the impact of this variable is statistically different than 
zero, there is some reason to believe that the level of Social Security Surplus does have a 
measurable negative effect on the level of personal savings. News about the relative health of 
the trust fund and other associated information could presumably impact current workers by 
instilling a false sense of security about the future of their own benefits.
Also of note is the observed impact upon savings due to the inclusion of each of these 
variables. The Social Security Income factor seems to reduce savings by 42% while a reduction 
of 43% is noted for the surplus variable. This is a slightly larger negative impact than witnessed 
by Feldstein in his model, however it only seems relevant in the case where low risk investment 
alternatives are also included in the model. In the case of the higher risk investment alternatives, 
there does not appear to be any significance attributed to even one of the Social Security factors.
The final independent variable yielded quite possibly the most interesting results of the 
entire model. The Disposable Personal Income variable appeared in each regression and was 
found to be highly significant in each case. The predicted effects were in fact realized; a positive 
impact less than one that may be interpreted as the marginal propensity to save. The most 
interesting aspect is that the Social Security factors, although themselves found to be largely 
insignificant, appeared to have a measurable affect on this marginal propensity to save. Given 
that only the Social Security variables changed in each family of regressions, it is interesting to 





SS Income SS Outlays SS Surplus
As seen in the above chart, when modeled against the low risk investment strategies, the 
marginal propensity to save varies depending upon the corresponding Social Security factor also
appearing in the regression. The Surplus variable yields the lowest marginal saving rate of 
approximately 23%, while the Outlay variable is associated with the highest propensity to save 
which increases to 34%.
In the case of the higher risk investments, the span of difference remains about the same.. 
Here the marginal rate takes upon a low value of 27% when the Surplus variable also appears in 
the regression and increases to 37% when coupled with the Social Security Outlay variable. 
Overall, the marginal propensity to save appears to be measurably higher when associated with 
the higher risk investment alternatives. One possible conclusion may be that individuals are 
more interested in saving a larger proportion of their disposable income when the expected 
returns to such investments are noticeably greater. However, without the statistical significance 
of even one of the higher risk investment variables, one must be very careful in crediting the 
differences in marginal savings rates to this sole factor.
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Further investigation of the relationship between the personal income variable and each 
of the Social Security factors also yields some interesting results. Utilizing the Pearson 
Correlation Coefficients, it was found that the Social Security Income and Outlay variables were 
very highly correlated with personal income. The reason could be due to the fact that each of 
these Social Security factors impacts the disposable amount of income either by decreasing 
(Income) the amount or by increasing (Outlay) the amount. The very large correlation measure, 
approaching .99 in both cases, is most likely impacted by other factors that are not entirely 
encompassed in this model. The remaining Social Security factor was found to be not nearly as 
correlated to the value of the personal income variable.
The indication that one independent variable could be correlated with another is also an 
early indication of multicollinearity. An affliction of most time-series data models, the effect of 
multicollinearity is that witnessed t-statistics will be artificially low and we are unable to reject 
the null hypothesis. Further diagnostics reveal that multicollinearity could indeed be a problem 
considering the high condition index scores resulting in the model. Each of the regressions 
yielded condition index scores in excess of 200, a strong indication that this problem is indeed 
present.
Another problem afflicting most time-series data models is that of autocorrelation. In
this case the t-statistics will be artificially inflated and we will be apt to reject the null hypothesis 
under false pretenses. In order to quantify the effects of this problem, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic was diagnosed for each regression and is provided as part of the summary statistics. A 
review of the data reveals that each regression yielded a Durbin-Watson statistic close to a value 
of two, the threshold at which autocorrelation is said not to be a problem. In regards to the 
diagnostics ran on the model, it appears that we will be much more inclined to refuse to reject the 
null hypothesis rather than inappropriately deem variables as being statistically significant.
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Economic Consequences o f the Model
The impact observed upon the marginal propensity to save could shed an entirely 
different light on the debate in measuring the true impact of Social Security. Previous 
explorations of this topic assumed that a direct correlation would be realized between the 
variable corresponding to Social Security wealth and the measure used for personal savings or, 
alternatively, personal consumption. Economists tried in earnest to prove the existence of this 
relationship with a high degree of confidence. Much effort has gone into constructing 
complicated, and consequently, fragile variables that were supposed to correspond to future 
Social Security benefits which would be awaiting today’s workers once they finally reached 
retirement. It did not seem to matter that the average worker may not be able to comprehend the 
calculations and any subsequent perceived effect of their savings behavior becomes highly 
questionable. The elusive key would be to find a measure of future Social Security wealth that is 
readily accepted as accurate and is such public knowledge as to actually have an effect on the 
savings habits of today’s workers.
Instead of focusing another attempt at deriving this elusive measure of future benefits, I 
instead decided to look at the effect of current Social Security factors. It was asserted that the 
current actions of government in regards to Social Security policies would adversely affect 
personal savings as current workers gained a false sense of security about their own future. The 
results of this model did not mount confidence that there exists this direct relationship between 
Social Security and personal savings. Instead, only two of the six regressions yielded a 
significant Social Security variable, and one of these was at a marginal level. Still, if we were to 
look exclusively at the resulting Social Security factors, it would seem that personal tax 
contributions do the most to affect the level of savings in this nation, while the relative size of the 
trust fund impacts savings to a lesser extent. Paying a portion of income every earning period to
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the Social Security Administration seems to have the most significant impact on the amount 
individuals would be expected to invest on their own in the absence of such a system.
What if no clear linkage exists between the noted factors of Social Security and personal 
savings? Due to the existence of so many variables that may in fact influence savings, we may 
never find this direct link no matter how diligent we are in constructing even more refined 
variables to explain the effects of Social Security. This does not mean that this established 
government retirement stipend has no influence on savings habits, however. Quite the contrary, 
the effects may be more subtly masked in their effect upon the proportion of savings expected 
with each marginal increase in disposable personal income. The individual Social Security 
variables do seem to exert influence on the marginal propensity to save, given that all other
variables in the model were held constant.
It is not enough to say that Social Security may have an influence on the marginal desire 
to save, but that different factors related to the same system may all exert their own individual 
impacts on the level of marginal changes in savings. Individuals can be expected to save the 
smallest proportion of their additional disposable income when adjusting to news on the Social 
Security Trust Fund. It remains to be seen whether information about its burgeoning coffers 
allows consumers to gain future confidence in the prospects for a fully funded retirement stipend 
or whether some unknown affect exerts this influence. Conversely, Social Security outlay levels 
for each year seem to propel individuals to take a more aggressive approach to saving for some
future uncertainty. A conclusion could be reached that individuals, wary of the news that levels
of benefits and the number of participants in the system are ever expending, may deem it 
necessary not to wait and see whether such a system will still be in existence once they enter the 
golden years of retirement.
The remaining Social Security factor, that measuring tax contributions, also showed 
moderate changes depending upon the investment alternatives that were also included in the
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regression. As the previous charts attest, there are many similarities found in both the levels of 
marginal savings and the volatility between the Social Security factors depending on the family 
of investments used as a part of the model. The marginal propensity to save is somewhat higher 
with respect to the riskier investment opportunities on the stock market. This leads to the 
conclusion that individuals may be enticed by potential greater rewards of investing in stocks. 
They would likely forego the prospects of the relatively safe investments including government 
and corporate bond issues if they do indeed decide to save a proportion of any additional units of 
income. The particular level of marginal income that can be expected to be invested is further 
impacted by the specific Social Security factor which mold their views on the system, if we are 
to take the results of the model as any indication.
The strong statistical significance of several of the other variables may also provide 
insight into the relative economic effects apart from these Social Security factors. Net wealth, 
the federal surplus/deficit account for a given year, and the unemployment rate may all exert 
strong influences on the aggregate personal savings habits of the nation. What the significance 
of these variables really highlights the fact that many influences comprise the overall savings 
habits of individuals. It may be quite a stretch to attribute even a causal relationship to a single 
factor, such as Social Security wealth. Blindly proceeding under the belief that a single factor 
could have such a measurable impact on personal savings could result in hasty policy 
conclusions and subsequent economic effects that were never considered.
Critique of Model and Future Endeavors
To a large extent, the development of this model was a departure from previous 
excursions into quantifying the effects of Social Security on personal savings. Although I 
utilized the findings of previous models in order to ensure the inclusion of certain important
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variables, such as the unemployment rate and net personal wealth, it was not my intention to 
replicate a construction of an ambiguous value of future benefits. To this extent, the only Social 
Security factors that were included were constructed from the level of benefits enjoyed by 
today’s retirees and contributions made by today’s workers. However, I may have overlooked 
several other important influences in regards to developing an accurate representation of the 
personal savings model.
For the most part, individuals cannot be expected to immediately assimilate knowledge 
into a far reaching savings plan. Instead many individuals might take time to accumulate 
relevant knowledge and direct their efforts into developing a well planned strategy. Information 
regarding the recent, but still historical, nature of investment returns, retirement stipends and the 
level of disposable personal income may exert an even stronger influence on today’s savings 
habits. Regressions that contain similar data that is lagged for one or more periods may replicate 
the true methods that are used in developing a personal savings strategy. Several of these 
regressions were in fact undertaken, but the results were anything but conclusive. Even more 
strife with the problem of multicollinearity, these models had diminished r-squared values and 
virtually no significant independent variables. Hardly any conclusions could be reached after a 
review of this sampling of alternative regressions, however future endeavors may aim to quantify 
which historical data is most used in orchestrating a personal savings agenda. Utilizing this 
information, a more substantial model may be developed and the resulting influence of the Social 
Security factors on personal savings levels as well as on the marginal rates of savings may be 
more fully realized.
A separate concern that has never been adequately addressed by any of these modeling 
attempts is the true composition of personal savings. It is taken for granted that all savings 
addresses the needs of retirement and each of these models includes the level of aggregate 
personal savings as a proxy for this variable. However, this is not really the case. In exploring
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the reasons behind savings, it is abundantly clear that retirement savings may make up only a 
small token of any potential portfolio and its relative importance is largely dependent on the 
stage of life in which the individual finds themselves. Savings, although defined as preparing for 
the uncertainties of an unknown future, may take upon a largely short-sided aspect as well. 
Younger adults are more likely to be accumulate funds with the goal of putting a down payment 
on a house or meeting an unexpected emergency. As a family or individual progresses along in 
their life, the focus of savings is often to finance higher education for their children or meeting 
the needs of an unexpected job loss or career change. It is only after these needs have been met 
that all but the most far-sighted individuals began preparing for their inevitable retirement. 
While this has historically been the case for most individuals, recent developments have changed 
the scope and awareness with respect to retirement. Such instruments as Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans in which employers match employee contributions for 
retirement have enticed a great many people to become more aware and diligent about 
preparations for their golden years. As more data becomes available and the time series duration 
lengthens, it will be interesting to see the effects that such alternative approaches to retirement 
have had not just on personal savings levels, but on people’s attitudes about Social Security as 
well.
The effect of Social Security factors on the marginal propensity to save may offer more 
insight as to its measurable impact on savings habits. The adjustment of just a single variable in 
the model, such as Social Security contributions, may allow a researcher to more clearly define 
the subsequent impact of marginal increases in personal income with regards to savings. Future 
modeling efforts may look to slightly alter the composition of the basic regression in order to 
quantify the effects of changing Social Security factors with regard to other important economic 
considerations, such as the price level or relative changes in wage levels. The effects of the
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previously mentioned lagged variables may also be interesting to note if they comprise a portion 
of the basic regression model.
54
CHAPTER VI: LOOKING TOWARD AN 
UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Even including the poor performance of the stock market in the past ten years, 
the long-term rate of return on equity investments has averaged more than 
6 or 7 percentage points above the rate of inflation. Thus, as individuals are 
forced to provide more of their retirement income than Social Security, they 
are also being forced to invest in a program whose real rate of return is far 
below what could be earned through a private retirement program.
— Robert Kaplan, Carnegie Mellon Economist (Ferrara).
Retirement systems that follow the premise of “pay-as-you-go” add nothing to the 
production of a nation since none of these resources are essentially saved or invested (Ferrara 
1985). The result is merely a transfer of funds from one segment of the population to the current 
retirement constituency. The impact is that individuals may endure an opportunity cost of not 
investing their income over the course of their working lives in the financial assets offered by the 
private sector and the considerably higher returns these markets tend to offer. In addition, 
society may also be enduring a lost opportunity since an enormous amount of funds are not being 
utilized in order to increase the productive capacity of our nation through expanded investment in 
capital and labor. The true measure of this impact would ultimately have to be derived by 
comparing the expected increases in the expansion of this productive capacity as opposed to the 
opportunities now being afforded to society with these funds being managed through a 
government program.
The prospects of such potential returns within a compulsory plan drive right to the heart 
of the essential problems associated with the current structure of Social Security. Today’s 
average recipient receives seven times the amount of contributions they made over their working 
life (O’Reilly 1995). However, such an amazing return on the “investment” of one’s payroll
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taxes is quickly beginning to deteriorate. As the nation becomes grayer and the burden of 
retirement payments is borne by an increasingly smaller work force, the prospects for future 
benefits that even approach the levels enjoyed by today’s retirees is slim at best. Current 
estimations are that the payment of benefits will start to exceed the receipts of payroll taxes by 
the year 2013. The Social Security Trust Fund, where all excess contributions are currently 
invested, will exhaust its reserves by the year 2029 (Hage 1995). Such estimations may be 
overly optimistic when one considers the inability to account for such uncertainties as recessions, 
collapse of financial institutions, or other economic calamities. The prospect for future 
retirement benefits is so bleak, that more people under the age of thirty-five believe in 
unidentified flying objects than believe the notion that Social Security will be solvent when they 
retire (Hull 1995).
Chilean Innovations in State Retirement Benefits
The country of Chile experienced the same ominous future for its compulsory retirement
plan in the early 1980s. After modeling their original program along the same lines as our Social 
Security system, they realized a few decades later that demographic imbalances would surely 
bankrupt their entire government unless major reforms were undertaken. Instead of relying on 
small incremental changes that only aim to save the current level of benefits at the expense of a
future generation’s wages, they chose a more radical approach. The Chilean government 
completely scrapped their former system in favor of a welfare system for retirees in poverty 
coupled with a private investment plan for each of the members of their working population. 
Each worker contributes ten percent of their pre-tax salary into a private pension plan which he 
or she chooses (Koselka 1991). Chileans may pick any one of ten separate investment plans, 
closely monitored by the government and covering the entire spectrum of investment risk.
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Early critics of the system quickly condemned its prospects, stating the average peasant 
could not understand the intricacies of investment markets and would have nothing to show for 
their efforts upon retirement. A little more than a decade later, the average Chilean worker now 
retires with a net worth that is four times their average income. Compare this to the retiree in our 
country whose net worth is usually only equal to a single year of income. Their national savings 
rate has risen from the anemic levels long experienced by the United States, to an astounding rate 
of twenty-nine percent (Hull 1995). Upon retirement, the Chilean worker can purchase an 
annuity or organize an individual payment schedule in order to live off of the interest of their 
contributions. The high returns and new found appreciation for the power of compounding 
interest rates have spurred many people to contribute even more than is required by law (Koselka 
1991).
Success is based on the very simple and reasonable principle that people care
about their money. That they will work harder if they see the benefit to
themselves and that putting it into private hands is more efficient than
with the government.
— Antonio Iglesias, Chief Economist for Pension Fund (Koselka 1991).
Ironically, the blueprint for the Chilean retirement system was devised by prominent 
free-market economists from Harvard, MIT, and the University of Chicago (Koselka 1991). 
Knowing that such a radical change would be met with contempt in this country, they marketed 
their plan to more progressive minds south of the border. The Chileans have had such 
resounding success that Argentina, Australia, and Sweden are all developing similar systems to 
replace their respective social insurance retirement plans (Koselka 1991).
The Chilean example could never work in this country, or so contend many critics of this 
successful venture. They are a third world country that can realize more immediate gains from 
the influx of capital that such a system produces. They are not burdened with generations of 
workers expecting at least the same standard of living of today’s retirees. Lastly, the Chilean
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system was instituted by a dictator who did not have to answer at the voting booths to angry 
elderly masses that turn against individuals who tamper with their benefits.
To some extent, these critics understand the magnitude of establishing a retirement 
system as radical as the Chileans. The Social Security Administration has estimated that the 
federal government would have to pay a bill in excess of eight trillion dollars in order to liquidate 
the current system and establish a private system (Hage 1995). Since this amount is 
approximately equal to six times the entire current federal budget, such an alternative is clearly 
not acceptable. However, one should consider these costs to be borne by the Social Security 
system regardless of whether an alternative plan is implemented, since the figure is merely an 
estimate of future benefits that will have to be paid. If not now, then in the future. If reforms 
could be enacted today that would alleviate the cost of operating the Social Security system 
tomorrow, than such revisions should most certainly be examined.
Demographic Trends and Other Impending Challenges
Social Security has always been considered part of the “three legged stool” that would be 
utilized to guarantee a comfortable journey into one’s retirement years. Along with a solid 
company pension plan and a carefully planned personal savings portfolio, individuals would be 
well taken care of long after they no longer could provide productive labor services 
(La Plante 1995). However, the continued uncertainty about the future of Social Security and 
with the same burdensome demographic challenges facing most company pension plans, the onus 
has been placed on the individual to provide a nest egg for their retirement. Ironically, the very 
systems that were supposed to mitigate uncertainty about one’s golden age, Social Security and 
pensions, are now cause for the greatest amount of consternation.
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The demographic factors bearing down on the ability of Social Security to meet its future 
obligations are not so much due to the constant increase in this country’s life expectancy rate. 
These rates are based on the population of the entire country and their continual increase could 
actually strengthen the capacity of the current Social Security system. If the average individual 
is expected to live at least until the age of retirement, than we should be able to count on many 
decades of contributions into the system while they are part of the country’s labor force.
The true cause for concern is the amount of years an individual can be expected to live 
after they have reached the age of retirement coupled with increases in the elderly population as 
compared to the whole. Once an individual reaches the age of sixty-five, they can expect to live 
for seventeen more years (Census 1995). In addition, the population of those aged eighty-five 
and over, well beyond this country’s stated life expectancy, is increasing at an astounding pace - 
274% from the years 1960 to 1994 (Census 1995). In effect, the fastest growing proportion of 
our population are those individuals that can expect to receive Social Security benefits for twenty 
years or more, total benefits received far exceeding any contributions made during their working 
lives. This is not even considering that the Baby Boomers are not expected to began retiring 
until after the turn of the century. Once this enormously sized generation starts to apply for 
benefits between the years 2010 and 2030, the average annual increase in the number of elderly 
will effectively double. According to the calculations of one estimate, by the year 2050 one in 
every five Americans will be considered part of this elderly population (Census 1995). Adding 
to the level of anxiety is the fact that the post-Baby Boomer generation is not even comparable in 
size, yet they will be expected to finance the retirement benefits of their predecessors if the 
current “pay-as-you-go” scheme remains intact.
In order to meet these challenges of the not too distant future, several economists have 
put forth some rather radical ideas. The most obvious solution to some would be to simply 
discontinue the separation between Social Security contributions and general revenue taxation
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for the government. The reason being that for years politicians have used the trust fund’s 
investment in treasury bills to finance the immediate needs of government. The elimination of 
this illusory difference between the revenues would yield a more realistic accounting of the 
actual budget deficit, since Social Security “surpluses” could no longer be applied in order to 
lessen the budgetary shortfalls. However, the discontinuation of this division between regular 
government programs and Social Security may have a disheartening affect upon the millions of 
workers contributing to the system. According to one economist, allowing the Social Security 
Trust Fund to be folded into general revenues would make little economic difference, but could 
have far reaching symbolic significance. The impression that they are providing for their own 
future cushions the impact of contributing to the trust fund and may actually make them willing 
to pay more in taxes (Penner 1989).
The termination of this division in government revenues may have an associated adverse 
affect as well. By allowing the Social Security Trust Fund to be included in the accounting 
ledger of the federal government, under the title of “off-budget” income, the actual level of 
annual deficits is masked. Unleashing the true size of these deficits could require the immediate 
need for higher taxes to pay for the effects of all previously unpublished spending. The result of 
these increased taxes would be a decreased ability to save due to the reduction in disposable 
income (Penner 1989). In the most mysterious of ways, the continuation of the Social Security 
system in its present state may actually be promoting a higher level of personal savings by 
masking the true size of the federal budget deficit.
Another proposed solution would be to increase the flow of immigration to the United 
States. This would have the immediate effect of raising the ratio of workers to the retired 
population and would diminish the great demographic problem that seems destined to bankrupt 
Social Security (Penner 1989). An added benefit, according to the author, is that first generation 
immigrants have historically had higher birth rates than established citizens and this could further
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the proliferation of a larger work force in the coming years. He does not address, however, such 
basic concerns as finding adequate jobs for this new influx of citizens or the cost of providing 
education and other necessary public services for the next generation of workers.
Some economists simply do not see what all the fuss is about with regards to reforming 
Social Security. The increased burden on future workers is considered by some to be quite small 
when compared to the overall size of the Gross Domestic Product or aggregate total wages. In 
fact, Henry Aaron calculated that in the year 2060, the required tax rate to fully fund the system 
would only be 14.7% (Penner 1989). This differs quite substantially from the findings of several 
economists who calculated Social Security contribution rates in excess of 40% for the current 
generation of young workers once they near retirement (Hull 1995). The wide range of these 
calculations may be attributed to differing perceptions regarding the health of the trust fund. In 
Aaron’s study it was presupposed that the healthy surpluses of the past would allow Social 
Security benefits to remain constant with only minimal increases in the taxation rate simply by 
utilizing the reserves of the trust fund. Conversely, if one believes that the trust fund has been 
used to finance general revenue programs over the past several decades, then the only means to 
continue to operate Social Security will be through payroll deductions, and the current rate will 
have to be increased dramatically to account for changing demographic trends. A small minority 
of economists have even contended that continued surpluses in the Social Security system could 
eventually erase the federal deficit problem.
While such radical measures may not be entirely necessary, it does stand to reason that 
the Social Security system needs to be modified in order to meet the demands of the coming 
millennium. The canvas of American life has changed substantially over the course of the past 
six decades, but the largest of government programs has not always been swift in meeting these 
new challenges. Life expectancy when the original act was enacted stood at 63 years. Today the 
rate is approaching 72 years for men and 79 years for women and there is every indication that
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the expectancy will continue to rise as medical advancements flourish (La Plante 1995). With 
such an increase in the expected life span of an American citizen, one would expect a correlated 
increase in the date at which benefits are assumed to begin. Milton Friedman has long been an 
advocate of raising the minimum age of receiving benefits until individuals have reached their 
seventies in order to counter the effects of this increased life expectancy. However, this has not 
been the case. While there currently exists a penalty for receiving benefits earlier than 65 years 
of age and this mandated age is slated to increase by a full year in the very near future, such 
small modifications have been met with stem criticism and rebuke by the potent elderly political 
constituency.
Remedies may also focus on strengthening the sometimes forgotten “third leg” of 
retirement preparation in hopes of alleviating the burden on Social Security and distraught 
company pensions plans. Enticing individuals to save could do much to diminish the level of 
dependence on a government retirement stipend and make future prospects for reform much 
easier to enact. Such measures as increasing in the tax benefits of IRAs and 401(k) plans and 
decreasing or eliminating the capital gains taxes could provide the necessary impetus that many 
need to initiate a personal savings plan. However, such a revision to the current tax code does 
not solely impact future reliance on Social Security, and may have a much more immediate effect 
on the current level of general revenues. Even though the ultimate gains of decreasing reliance 
on Social Security could be quite substantial, many citizens and elected representatives would be 
very reluctant to suffer the consequences of decreasing general revenues in the present in order to 
achieve this goal.
Real reform will have to embody a long range outlook to the nation’s economic future 
and be constructed to weather strong criticism from those expecting at least the same level of 
benefits as their predecessors. However, politicians possess notoriously short time horizons and 
events projected for the next century often have only trivial effects on the decisions of today
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(Penner 1989). The current prospects for reform have been embodied in recent bipartisan
legislation brought to the U.S. Congress by Senator Bob Kerrey (D - Nebraska) and Senator Alan 
Simpson (R - Wyoming). The cornerstone of their proposal is the investment of two percent of 
the current payroll deduction into a Personal Investment Plan endorsed by the government (Cruz 
1995). The authors of the bill believe this could provide for the current stream of benefits, while 
establishing a personal nest egg for future retirees. Such a system is modeled to some extent 
after the successful 401(k) and 403(b) retirement plans that have gained enormous popularity 
over the past several decades. Instead of burdening the future growth of their businesses with 
tomorrow’s pension checks, many firms are opting to harness the growth of private investments 
to provide for these workers as they progress into their golden years. The implementation of 
such a program in the infancy of Social Security may well have averted much of the difficulties 
that we are currently experiencing.
Whatever reform is eventually embraced, we should hope that it exemplifies the original 
intentions of President Roosevelt and his commission. Providing a basic stipend paid through 
the contributions of our work force in order to prevent a great many retirees with being 
confronted with the horrors of poverty during their later years. Somehow the citizens of this 
country must be persuaded that if we continue with the current policies, we are treating future 
generations very badly relative to how our predecessors have treated us (Penner 1989).
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YEAR : SOC SEC
SUM»LUS
1948 $4329.2 $11,711 $3,623 $8.0881
1949 $4576.9 $12,162 $4,178 $7.9836
1950 $4817.5 $14,486 $4,798 $9.6879
1951 $5224.4 $21,426 $9,856 $11.5704
1952 $5332.4 $24,167 $12,704 $11.4628
1953 $5478.2 $26,186 $15,870 $10.3154
1954 $5853.6 $28,555 $19,059 $9.4958
1955 $6095.3 $30,733 $24,631 $6.1022
1956 $6275.9 $36,382 $28,762 $7.6193
1957 $6231.7 $35,206 $33,044 $2.1616
1958 $6707.9 $36,841 $37,858 -$1.0169
1959 $6856.8 $36,056 $41,694 -$5.6381
1960 $6974.7 $44,066 $47,082 -$3.0157
1961 $7462.0 $49,123 $48,733 $0.3905
1962 $7299.3 $49,024 $54,200 -$5.1755
1963 $7713.8 $54,465 $57,119 -$2.6533
1964 $8127.8 $61,799 $58,875 $2.9237
1965 $8516.6 $61,951 $60,245 $1.7057
1966 $8420.0 $67,573 $68,704 -$1.1310
1967 $9078.4 $83,082 $70,135 $12.9470
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1969 $9321.6 $88,448 $79,851 $8.5964
1970 $9275.9 $96,728 $83,242 $13.4857
1971 $9712.1 $96,870 $91,984 $4.8860
1972 $10368.9 $101,488 $95,953 $5.5353
1973 $10022.6 $110,172 $110,131 $0.0404
1974 $9474.6 $118,261 $114,980 $3.3713
1975 $10037.3 $123,489 $119,117 $4.3716
1976 $10847.0 $151,205 $156,776 -$5.5715
1977 $11015.2 $129,993 $133,042 -$3.0491
1978 $11504.5 $129,573 $136,985 -$7.4123
1979 $12250.4 $134,885 $139,908 -$5.0233
1980 $12802.8 $140,877 $145,349 -$4.4720
1981 $12627.2 $155,523 $156,459 -$0.9364
1982 $12929.7 $151,307 $164,809 -$13.5022
1983 $13418.4 $171,588 $175,466 -$3.8776
1984 $13667.2 $178,975 $177,979 $0.9962
1985 $14549.5 $192,855 $181,564 $11.2918
1986 $15425.1 $201,713 $184,460 $17.2532
1987 $15906.3 $207,525 $186,780 $20.7450
1988 $16265.8 $228,352 $191,002 $37.3506
1989 $17160.8 $241,834 $194,341 $47.4928
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1990 $16472.6 $247,828 $198,967 $48.8601
1991 $17504.5 $250,995 $206,886 $44.1085
1992 $17874.8 $252,115 $210,367 $41.7483
1993 $18501.2 $255,195 $215,744 39.4510
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1948 $968.7 $76,474 514387 3.8%
1949 $956.5 $3,793 5.08523 5.9%
1950 $1033.9 -$18,972 4.94362 5.3%
1951 $1099.8 $38,317 4.85886 3.3%
1952 $1146.6 -$9,219 4.69719 3.0%
1953 $1191.4 -$37,967 4.56327 2.9%
1954 $1197.5 -$6,799 4.47677 5.5%
1955 $1267.0 -$16,657 4.38162 4.4%
1956 $1335.5 $20,451 4.35286 41%
1957 $1368.0 $16,857 4.32493 4.3%
1958 $1384.4 -$13,183 4.23440 6.8%
1959 $1449.1 -$56,914 416291 5.5%
I960 $1489.4 $1,276 410009 5.5%
1961 $1536.9 -$13,710 4.01592 6.7%
1962 $1609.1 -$28,980 4.03615 5.5%
1963 $1663.5 -$18,868 3.97199 5.7%
1964 $1754.3 -$22,727 3.96276 5.2%
1965 $1861.9 -$5,283 3.96136 4.5%
1966 $1966.1 -$13,543 3.96987 3.8%
1967 $2058.7 -$30,572 3.97305 3.8%
1968 $2166.5 -$86,095 3.99416 3.6%
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1969 $2269.6 $10,349 4.00086 3.5%
1970 $2330.8 -$8,531 4.01522 4.9%
1971 $2390.9 -$65,564 4.02563 5.9%
1972 $2527.4 -$62,634 4.01437 5.6%
1973 $2676.8 -$37,617 4.04339 4.9%
1974 $2669.5 -$14,163 4.05371 5.6%
1975 $2676.3 -$111,812 4.05133 8.5%
1976 $2793.5 -$170,246 4.02469 7.7%
1977 $2891.4 -$97,230 4.02469 7.1%
1978 $3042.9 -$99,865 4.04085 6.1%
1979 $3143.1 -$63,179 4.06823 5.8%
1980 $3171.9 -$103,914 4.08301 7.1%
1981 $3259.0 -$101,062 4.07841 7.6%
1982 $3272.2 -$152,945 4.05682 9.7%
1983 $3321.9 -$236,782 4.02778 9.6%
1984 $3520.7 -$203,178 4.00136 7.5%
1985 $3631.7 -$224,609 3.99578 7.2%
1986 $3739.3 -$227,221 3.98032 7.0%
1987 $3801.6 -$149,800 3.97738 6.2%
1988 $3910.3 -$149,792 3.97905 5.5%
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1990 $4067.2 -$196,242 3.96571 5.5%
1991 $4046.9 -$228,465 3.92844 6.7%
1992 $4153.4 -238.365 3.88272 7.4%




































1957 12.662% 15.774% 21.392% -3.509%
1958 -1.153% -2.571% 0.425% 3.353%
1959 18.950% 15.567% 6.765% 28.569%
I960 -1.471% 0.685% 2.772% -2.227%
1961 -2.985% -1.361% -2.119% 11.894%
1962 1.282% -0.460% -1.181% -7.489%
1963 1.266% -1.617% -3.187% 11.731%
1964 3.750% 3.286% -0.617% 16.681%
1965 1.446% 2.045% 0.828% 9.212%
1966 10.451% 14.254% 16.427% -4.093%
1967 4.301% 7.407% 9.877% 0.632%
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1969 16.350% 13.754% 12.536% -3.232%
1970 7.516% 14.367% 16.645% -14.090%
1971 -12.766% -8.085% -6.037% 17.468%
1972 -1.742% -2.436% -4.673% 7.454%
1973 11.879% 3.190% 0.980% -2.822%
1974 10.618% 15.188% 15.291% -17.806%
1975 0.287% 3.034% 11.684% 5.678%
1976 -3.143% -4.530% -8.106% 21.487%
1977 4.130% -4.864% -8.000% -8.236%
1978 11.756% 8.853% 5.797% -8.316%
1979 10.773% 10.309% 12.645% 2.947%
1980 23.684% 23.988% 27.877% 5.567%
1981 19.056% 18.677% 17.337% 4.657%
1982 -4.973% -2.682% 0.436% -5.205%
1983 -11.365% -12.690% -15.891% 34.599%
1984 10.609% 5.565% 4.723% 0.996%
1985 -10.342% -10.543% -10.359% 12.707%
1986 -24.279% -20.668% -18.318% 34.974%
1987 6.020% 3.991% 1.829% 26.955%
1988 4.056% 3.518% 2.363% -9.454%
1989 -4.343% -4.634% -6.002% 21.743%
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1990 1.630% 0.648% 1.768% 6.777%
1991 -6.529% -5.901% -5.405% 9.347
1992 -7.843% -7.184% -8.367% 12.117%
































































All Dollar Figures are Stated in 1987 Constant Dollars Unless Otherwise Noted.
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